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Social influences in forest owners’ choice between co-operative and 
investor-owned buyers 
 
This study investigates the role of social networks when producers choose a buyer for their produce – 
either a co-operative or an investor-owned firm. The empirical basis is personal interviews with ten 
forest owners, five co-operative suppliers and five IOF suppliers. Two propositions get support: Forest 
owners influence each other as to choice of buyer, and Social influences are stronger among co-
operative members. Two other propositions are rejected: Social networks are more important for 
forest owners who seek primarily monetary benefits from their forestry, and Forest owners, who are 
uncertain, are more influenced by social networks. The study indicates that social networks are 
important for producers’ choice of buyers. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This study investigates the extent to which social networks influence producers when they 
decide which buyer they will sell their produce to, a co-operative or an investor-owned firm 
(IOF). The empirical data originate from interviews with ten forest owners in Sweden, half of 
them co-operative members and half of them sellers to IOFs.  
 
In most literature on agriculture, forestry is not mentioned. In Sweden, forestry is, however, 
considered to be one of the four major agricultural industries together with grain production, 
dairying and meat production. The explanation is that in Sweden, like in Finland and Norway, 
forests to a large extent (50%) are owned by private persons, who often have small lots, on 
average 60 hectares, whereas forests in most other countries are owned by large corporations 
or by governments (Digby and Edwardson, 1976). As the forests are owned by thousands of 
individuals (350,000 in Sweden), most often farmers, it is understandable that these 
individuals have established co-operative firms. Half of the country’s forest owners are 
members of forestry co-operatives (Berlin, 2005). The co-operatives buy timber from the 
members, and they sell services to the members in terms of cleaning, thinning, cutting and 
final cutting, compiling forest management plans, and all other tasks that should be conducted 
in the members’ forests.  
 
The forestry co-operatives compete with various investor-owned firms, which perform all the 
tasks that co-operatives do. The number of IOF sawmills is large, as many such firms operate 
regionally. They are often small family-owned businesses. Moreover, there are some 
multinational corporations buying timber for their paper pulp production.  
 
Even though forestry co-operatives in Sweden are considered to belong to the agricultural co-
operative sphere, they differ in major respects from co-operatives in other agricultural 
industries (Berlin and Erikson, 2007). One difference is that forestry has always worked on 
free and open markets, whereas co-operatives in other agricultural industries may be supposed 
to have been influenced by agricultural policies. The forestry industry has also always sold to 
international markets whereas other agricultural co-operatives have historically been oriented 
towards the national markets or even regional or local markets.  
 
Hence, forestry co-operatives are highly market oriented, whereas co-operatives in the other 
agricultural industries tend to be more member-oriented and thus have not only business 
objectives but also social objectives. For example co-operative ideological issues are seldom 
heard in a forestry co-operative context. Nevertheless, the forestry co-operatives may be 
influenced by co-operatives in other agricultural industries to encompass social elements   2
since many forestry co-operative members are also members of other agricultural co-
operatives.  
 
Against this background an investigation of forest owners’ choice of buyers is an interesting 
task. One would expect the forest owners to be quite business oriented, i.e. they try to 
maximise the value of their forests.  
 
The issue of farmers’ choice between co-operative and investor-owned trading partners has 
been investigated in a large number of empirical studies. Closely linked to this research 
tradition are issues concerning farmers’ loyalty towards co-operatives, their trust in the 
leadership, their attitude towards co-operatives, and other behavioural dimensions. The 
explanatory variables used in those studies are of two kinds. 
 
One type is socio-economic factors, such as the farmers’ age, the size of the farm operations 
and similar factors (Bravo-Ureta and Lee, 1988; Burt and Wirth, 1990; Wadsworth, 1991; 
Fulton and Adamowitcz, 1993; Klein, Richards and Walburger, 1997; Zeuli and Betancor, 
2005; Berlin 2006). The other type is socio-psychological variables. The farmers’ behaviour 
is explained by variables such as satisfaction, trust, involvement, attitude and commitment 
(Jensen, 1990; Robinson and Lifton, 1993; Siebert, 1994; Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; Hakelius, 
1996; Borgen, 2001; Hansen, Morrow and Batista, 2002; Lind and Åkesson, 2005; James and 
Sykuta, 2006; Bhuyan, 2007; Fahlbeck, 2007; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; Nilsson, Kihlén 
and Norell, 2009).  
 
An interesting observation is that none of the prior empirical studies include social influences 
as a potential explanatory variable. This study introduces social influences as a potential 
explanation to producers’ choice between co-operative and IOF trading partner.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a theoretical framework where 
the focus is directed towards farmers’ choice between different types of buyers. This section 
ends with the formulation of four propositions. The subsequent section presents the 
methodological approach for the empirical study – interviews with ten forest owners. An 
account of the types of buyers that the forest owners may choose between is found in the next 
section. The results from the interviews are reviewed thereafter, summarised in two tables. 
The final section comprises conclusions.  
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
The forest owners’ choice of buyer to deliver their timber to is reasonably well deliberated 
decisions. Such transactions involve large amounts of money, and the forest is normally of 
great importance to the forest owner. The choice of buyer may also be habitual behaviour as 
the forest owners may exhibit loyalty to their buying firms. However, even if habitual 
behaviour may prevail, the forest owners must at an earlier occasion have passed through a 
deliberate decision process.  
 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) tells that well deliberated decision making 
has a number of components. One is the decision-maker’s attitude towards the act of choosing 
various decisions outcomes. Another component is the decision-maker’s propensity to adhere 
to the social norms that exist among people who are significant to him or her. A third   3
component is the decision makers’ perception of being in control of their own behaviour. 
Finally, there may be a random element.  
 
Attitudes towards choosing a co-operative or an IOF buyer may have many dimensions. One 
is the monetary consequences, i.e. the price; a second is services provided by the processor; a 
third is the reputation of the processor, and so on.  
 
Many researchers claim that farmers focus mainly on the price that the processing firms pay 
for the agricultural commodities (Karantininis and Zago, 2001, 1266). It may be assumed that 
forest owners to a large extent consider the economic conditions when they are to find a 
buyer. The conditions are, however, more complex in a forestry context than they are in most 
other agricultural industries, such as grain or dairy. No two sales occasions are identical. All 
trees to be cut are different; the terrain where the trees should be cut is specific; it is difficult 
to assess the quality in advance. Hence, the forest owner has difficulties making a rational 
choice of buyer.  
 
In difficult decision situation humans have a number of behavioural traits. One is that the 
decision maker is struck by so-called information overload whereby the decision outcomes 
may become less well deliberated and have an element of randomness. Another trait is that 
the many complex parameters are merged into a more aggregate one, such as image or 
reputation. By choosing the option with the best reputation the decision maker reduces the 
risk-taking.  
 
The ownership of a forest also offers a range of non-price benefits, or benefits with indirect 
monetary effects. Berlin (2007) lists these: hunting, fishing, picking berries and mushrooms, 
collecting firewood and timber, outdoor life and recreation, residence in nice natural 
environment, etc. She continues to measure how forest owners appreciate these non-price 
benefits. In general they are extremely important to the forest owners.  
 
According to the Theory of Planned Behaviour decision makers are influenced by the norms 
that they find in their social environment. This is the theory’s variable Normative 
Compliance. The social network may consist of the family and relatives, but also the 
neighbours and friends. Other social contacts are with the timber buying firm’s local 
representative, the staff at the timber buying firm’s office (those responsible for paying for the 
supplies, receiving the order, etc.), and the entrepreneurs who conduct the cutting work with 
the help of their huge machineries. These social networks give rise to a question, which has 
not been previously researched: What importance have the various social relations for 
producers’ choice of buyer?  
 
The theory’s variable Perceived Control is of a different nature. If the forest owners do not 
themselves decide about to whom they should sell the timber, the study of their decision 
making makes less sense. Some external factors must be considered, for example contracts 
which limit the range of choice.  
 
Prior research about farmers’ choice of a co-operative firm as their buyer indicates that 
economic factors tend to be important. There is no reason to believe that forest owners are 
less interested in having a profitable business. Likewise, it is likely that the forest owners are 
in control of the decision about to whom their timber should be delivered. Hence, the focus of 
this study is directed towards the social networks, i.e. the forest owners’ propensity to comply 
with the social norms that exist among people who are important to them. Nevertheless, also   4
the economic and non-economic factors that compose the forest owners’ attitudes as well as 
their decision control must be investigated.  
 
Against this background it is possible to state a few propositions. It should be noted that the 
small number of empirical observations means that these propositions cannot be tested 
statistically.  
 
1.  Forest owners influence each other as to choice of buyer. Owning a forest property is 
a large investment and so, one may expect the forest owners to be highly involved in 
their forest. In order for the forest owners to reduce the risk taking, contacts with 
others may influence the choice of business partner – a co-operative one or an IOF. 
They can be expected to make the same choice as their social network does.  
 
2.  Social influences are stronger among co-operative members. A co-operative member 
organisation constitutes a forum for members who meet, get to know each other and 
discuss. There is no similar forum for the suppliers to IOFs.  
 
3.  The forest owners who seek primarily non-monetary benefits from their forests are 
more prone to sell to a co-operative. The choice of buyer is not based on price only. 
There are also non-monetary benefits from owning a forest, such as hunting, wildlife, 
recreation and mushroom and berry picking. For the forest owner who is mostly 
interested in getting the highest possible price for his timber, social interaction is due 
to be less important for the choice of buyer. The non-monetary values, on the other 
hand, are partly linked to social values, and these forest owners therefore prefer a co-
operative trading partner.  
 
4.  Forest owners, who are uncertain, are more influenced by social networks. Some 
forest owners have less knowledge about forestry than others. Those who live far 
away from the property and have another profession may have less expertise in 
forestry. Due to the lower level of knowledge these forest owners are more prone to be 
influenced by their social networks when they choose a co-operative buyer. A co-
operative firm is likely to be considered a safer trading partner due to less 
opportunism. 
 
 
Methodological approach 
 
In order to investigate the above-mentioned propositions data are needed of a type that can be 
collected only from forest owners. Considering that the desired data may be sensitive it was 
considered that the data must be obtained through personal interviews. Even though forestry 
co-operatives are less ideological than other agricultural co-operatives, there are still many 
feelings which may distort the information. Hence, personal interviews were conducted by 
two of the authors, both coming from forest owner families and having an education within 
forestry. This means that they are able to “speak the language” of the respondents, which 
increases the chances that the interviewees trust the interviewers and answer openly.  
 
Due to resource constraints and the time consuming interview technique the number of 
respondents must be small. Five members of a forestry co-operative were interviewed and 
five forest owners who usually sell their timber to other buyers. The small number of 
interviewees reduces the reliability of the findings, but at least some indications may result.    5
 
As this study has a focus on the forest owners’ social networks it was considered desirable to 
choose respondents who live relatively close to one another so that there would be good 
chances for social interaction. Hence all ten respondents live within one single parish. The 
fact that the interviewees live close to one another reduced the travel costs and the time used 
for the interviews. The parish was selected by the forestry co-operative’s member relations 
officer, the criterion being that the data should originate from a district where co-operative 
suppliers and IOF suppliers were of about the same number.  
 
The addresses to the five co-operative members were picked randomly from the co-
operative’s member register for the parish where the interviews were to be conducted. The 
five other forest owners were randomly selected from the register of real estate owners, 
erected by a governmental body. All the identified respondents accepted to become 
interviewed, and all were available at the agreed-upon hours.  
 
The interviews were conducted in March 2008. They took between fifteen and thirty minutes 
each. A total of three days were used for the interviews, including travels between the forest 
owners’ homes. All the interviews took place in the forest owners’ homes. After permission 
from the interviewees, all interviews were recorded whereby correct quotes can be included. 
The interviewees were promised confidentiality.  
 
An interview guide was produced, comprising in total 23 questions, including six background 
variables (acreage, type of forest, owner’s living at the property, length of ownership, length 
of family ownership, capital conditions). Four questions concerned the forest owners’ social 
networks in relation to their forestry. Nine questions concerned the forest owner’s knowledge, 
assessment and choice of the buyers of timber. Finally four questions concerned the forest 
owners’ view of their forest and the work in the forest.  
 
 
The forestry co-operative, Södra Skogsägarna, and the other buyers 
 
The interviewees may choose to sell their timber to a forestry co-operative or an IOF. These 
firms are presented in this section. Within the parish where the interviews were conducted 
there is one co-operative and a number of IOFs.  
 
Södra Skogsägarna (henceforth Södra) is by far the largest of the four Swedish forestry co-
operatives. It runs its operations in the southern Sweden. The membership consists of 52,000 
forest owners, living at 37,000 farms. In 2007 the turnover amounted to SEK 18,000 millions 
(EUR 1750 million). The number of employees was 3700 persons. The equity capital was 
SEK 10,500 million (EUR 1020 million) and the equity ratio was 63%. The return on capital 
was 15%. Södra has a market share of about 50% of the timber that is cut within its operating 
area. All figures originate from Södra’s annual report 2008. 
 
When Södra was established in 1938 it worked only as a bargaining co-operative, which is a 
common type of activity also today in the forestry co-operatives. The first production plants 
were established in 1940 (tar mill), 1943 (sawmill), and 1959 (paper pulp plant). Since then 
the number of sawmills has increased to nine. The largest investments have, however, been in 
the paper pulp industry. The paper pulp produced in these plants is sold to paper works all 
over the world. Södra is the world’s largest exporter of paper pulp and the world’s third 
largest producer of sulphate pulp.   6
Two of the five pulp plants are located in Norway. These are processing Norwegian timber, 
but the Norwegian suppliers are not members. Likewise, Södra imports large volumes of raw 
material predominantly from the Baltic countries.  
 
Except for wood processing Södra provides extensive services to its members. The forest 
owners can get practically all the help they would like – no service at all to those who manage 
their forestry operations themselves, and complete management of the forest for those who 
have no knowledge in forestry, no time or no opportunities for these activities. In between 
these extremes, Södra offers assistance in thinning, planting, cutting, etc. These services are 
offered to the members according to a service-at-cost principle.  
 
Other business branches are production of building material and energy production, both from 
the forests (fuel wood and wood chips) and from windmills. If the members want to, Södra 
may erect wind power plants in their forests.  
 
While by far most other agricultural co-operatives offer the members as high a commodity 
price as possible, Södra has another policy. The members’ supply of timber is paid at a market 
price. Hence, Södra has a profit maximisation objective. This has the consequence that Södra 
normally gets very high profits. One-third of the profits before taxes are paid to the members 
as capital returns in a variety of ways. On top of that are bonus shares. The rationale behind 
this profit distribution principle is that Södra at all times wants an even flow of raw material 
to its paper pulp plants. Given the huge investments in these plants, it is necessary to use the 
production capacity as much as possible. If the co-operative were to have a price 
maximisation goal, it would some years have too little raw material to its pulp plants and 
other years too much.  
 
The profit distribution takes place in various forms. First, the patronage refunds are most 
often quite high; almost 10%. Second, the members receive a high interest rate for the shares 
that they own (8-20% during the last few years). Third, Södra hands over bonus shares to the 
members every year, corresponding to a capital return of 5% per annum. Fourth, Södra has at 
two occasions emitted B-shares to be bought by members and by employees, and also these 
are awarded a very high interest rate, though depending on the profits. All the three types of 
shares are freely traded on the market, i.e. also appreciable. Finally, the members have the 
possibility to voluntarily invest more money in the co-operative, and also these investments 
give a high interest.  
 
Through this financial model, often called the Södra model, the co-operative is able to transfer 
more money to the member compared to if it were to pay the highest possible price for the 
timber. It is likely that in most cases the forest owners would get a better deal by selling to 
Södra, provided that all the future cash flows were included. For many members, not to talk 
about non-members, the Södra model is, however, difficult to comprehend. It is even more 
difficult to calculate what the economic benefits should be. Especially as most members are 
farmers, who are also members of other agricultural co-operatives, it is difficult to see why 
Södra should have such different principles and practices.  
 
The Södra model has a great importance for the member involvement. Having a large number 
of members, spread out over a large area, and having huge investments in widespread and 
complex business activities, mainly downstream the value chain, there is a great risk that 
members become alienated from the co-operative. Other studies of co-operatives with similar 
attributes indicate low trust in the leadership, low involvement, and low satisfaction   7
(Hogeland, 2006; Österberg and Nilsson, 2009; Nilsson, Kihlén, and Norell 2009). In a 
forestry co-operative context, the risk is even larger as the members typically deliver timber 
with several years’ interval. Thanks to the Södra model the members have dealings with the 
co-operative every year, though in their ownership role, not in their supplier role. Experience 
from Södra indicates that this reasoning is correct.  
 
It should be added that Södra is still a genuine co-operative as the only way whereby the 
members can get access to the profit-generating shares is through supplies, i.e. a small share 
of every timber payment is transferred to the members’ accounts. Hence, the members have a 
strong incentive to deliver to Södra.  
 
While Södra is the largest player in the parish, where the interviews took place, it has one-
third of the market in that parish. Of similar size is a firm that is owned jointly by the large 
paper pulp and paper corporations. A third actor is almost of the same size. It is a privately 
owned firm that runs sawmills in a large part of southern Sweden. Except for these three, 
several sawmills exist, often family-owned and quite small.  
 
 
Results 
 
The results from the five interviews with co-operative members are summarised in Table 1 
while Table 2 summarises the interviews with the five forest owners who sell their timber to 
IOF buyers. All the ten interviewees report that they are in full control of all decisions as to 
their forestry (column e in the two tables). Hence the choice of buyer is a deliberate decision, 
whereby the analyses can proceed.  
 
There are no socio-economic differences between the two groups. In terms of time 
perspective (column a) and acreage (column b) there is a within-group spread, but it is not 
possible to claim that systematic differences exist. The same is true for other background data.  
 
Forest ownership is loaded with traditions. Many of the interviewees grew up at the property 
that they now own, and their ancestors have often owned the same forest (column a). The 
most extreme in the sample is from a family that has owned the forest since 1727. Due to the 
traditional values in forestry, some forest owners want to manage their forest in the same 
manner as their parents (father) did. Several interviewees refer to their parents. This also 
applies to their choice of buyers, i.e. they have to some extent inherited the parents’ view on 
co-operatives, whether a positive view or a negative view. Therefore, the parents may be said 
to be an important part of the forest owners’ social network when it comes to choice of buyer 
of the timber.  
 
•  “Daddy was a member, too, and that is fun.” (Interviewee 4, co-operative supplier) 
•  “We are doing business with [name of one IOF buyer]. So did Daddy too.” (Interviewee 
7, IOF supplier) 
•  “I conduct the thinning in the same manner as my father did.” (Interviewee 10, IOF 
supplier) 
   8
 
Table 1: Summary of the interviews with forest owners who are cooperative members 
Forest 
owner 
a.  
Time 
perspective 
b. 
Acreage 
c.  
Activity 
level 
d. 
Knowledge 
in forestry 
e.  
Decision 
autonomy 
f.  
Price 
g.  
Non-price 
factors 
h. Network, 
neighbors 
i. 
Network, 
family 
j. Network, 
buyer 
k.  
Södra’s 
financial 
model 
l.  
Deliveries 
1 Fourth 
generation; 
has owned it 
himself for 
25 years 
125 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Extensive 
knowledge; 
“sufficient” 
He decides 
himself 
Most 
important 
for large 
fellings 
Small felling: 
not the price  
To some 
extent only; 
“too little” 
No Seeks 
advice 
Appreciates 
the high 
interest 
rates, but 
does not 
understand 
the model 
To Södra 
and one 
IOF buyer 
2 Since  many 
generations; 
has owned it 
himself for 
15 years 
130 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Very good 
knowledge 
He decides 
himself 
A secure 
relation is 
more 
important 
than money 
A secure and 
stable relation 
with Södra 
Yes, this 
happens 
Yes, a 
cousin is 
an expert 
Seeks 
advice 
Has deep 
knowledge; 
supports the 
model 
strongly 
Only to 
Södra 
3  50 years in 
the family 
20 
hectares 
Together 
with a 
neighbor 
Quite poor 
knowledge 
He decides 
himself 
Not very 
essential 
Does not 
mention 
anything 
One neighbor  No   Does not 
mention 
Positive but 
poorly 
informed 
Only to 
Södra 
4 Family  since 
1727; has 
owned it for 
10 years 
85 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Good 
knowledge 
He decides 
himself 
Has no 
answer to 
the question 
Has no answer 
to the question 
Talks to others 
but not 
influenced by 
them 
No   Seeks 
advice, 
trusts the 
buyer rep.  
Positive but 
not well 
informed 
Only to 
Södra 
5 30  years  100 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Good 
knowledge 
He decides 
himself 
Does not 
seek highest 
possible 
price 
Rather a secure 
partner 
Talks to others 
but not 
influenced by 
them 
No   Seeks 
advice, 
trusts the 
buyer rep. 
Positive and 
well 
informed 
Only to 
Södra   9
 
Table 2: Summary of the interviews with forest owners who are IOF suppliers 
Forest 
owner 
a. 
Time 
perspective 
b.  
Acreage 
c.  
Activity 
level 
d.  
Knowledge 
in forestry 
e.  
Decision 
autonomy 
f.  
Price 
g.  
Non-price 
factors 
h. 
Network, 
neighbors 
i. 
Network, 
family 
j.  
Network, 
buyer 
k.  
Södra’s 
financial 
model 
l.  
Deliveries 
6 Family  since 
abt. 1850; 
owned since 
1990 
40 
hectares 
Fairly 
active 
Quite 
limited 
knowledge 
The couple 
decide 
themselves 
Uncertain 
about 
prices 
“Good-
looking 
forest”; 
environmental 
certified 
Talks tp and 
collaborates 
with 
neighbors 
Wife and 
husband 
own the 
forest 
Personal 
relation 
with the rep. 
Very limited 
knowledge 
Loyal to 
one buyer 
7 Family  since 
1923; 
ownership 
since 20 yrs.  
20 
hectares 
Fairly 
active 
Much 
uncertainty 
The couple 
decide 
themselves 
Economy 
not 
essential 
Want to have 
a “nice forest” 
No talks to 
neighbors 
Wife and 
husband 
own the 
forest 
Trust the 
rep. and 
seek advice  
Negative, 
limited 
knowledge 
Loyal to 
one buyer 
8 Ownership 
since 1992 
340 
hectares 
Employed 
people do 
the 
practical 
work 
Very good 
knowledge 
He decides 
everything 
himself 
Economy 
is crucial 
Nothing else 
is important 
Very little; 
does not 
trust them 
Brothers   The rep. is 
almost a 
personal 
friend  
Sceptical Various 
IOF 
buyers  
9 Ownership 
since 1995 
15 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Good 
knowledge 
His own 
initiatives 
Economy 
the 
overriding 
issue 
Fuel wood for 
personal use  
Frequent 
contacts but 
is not much 
influenced 
No   Only 
business 
relation 
Has no 
knowledge 
and no 
interest 
Loyal to 
one buyer 
10   Fourth 
generation; 
Ownership 
for 40 yrs.  
50 
hectares 
Does 
everything 
himself 
Good 
knowledge 
His own 
initiative 
By far 
most 
important 
Not important  Often 
discussions, 
but no 
influence 
The 
couple 
owns the 
forest 
Appreciate 
the rep., 
who is their 
consultant 
Very poor 
knowledge; 
negative 
Loyal to 
one buyer  
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As to non-price motivational factors (column g), the members’ social networks have no 
influence. When the interviewees discuss with others, they never do that in connection with 
non-price dimensions. Walking in the forest for recreational purposes, enjoying nature, 
hunting elks and deer, and picking mushrooms and berries are private affairs. Moreover, the 
non-price dimension has limited importance for the choice of buyer, the main importance 
being that some entrepreneurs are believed to cause damage to the forest when cutting the 
trees with the help of their huge machines.  
 
It was expected that price and other economic factors (column f) would be a more important 
criterion for the co-operative members than for the IOF suppliers. On the basis of the 
interviews it is not possible to either confirm or reject this expectation. No forest owner says 
that the economic return is of no or little importance, but several have qualifications to the 
question. Two of the co-operative members say that long-term profitability is crucial but that 
does not mean that the price at every single sales occasion should be the highest possible. 
None of the IOF suppliers says the same while three of them stress the price for the single 
offers.  
 
•  “I sell to the one who pays the best, but of course also good service matters.” 
(Interviewee 1, co-operative supplier) 
•  “It may be that I could find another buyer who is willing to pay a higher price at specific 
occasions, but Södra is the best in the long run.” (Interviewee 2, co-operative supplier) 
 
Another observation is that the forest owners with the very small holdings are less interested 
in the price. They may even consider the fuel wood for their households to more important 
than the sales of timber. This holds true for suppliers both to the co-operative and to IOFs.  
 
The IOF suppliers’ stress on the price is surprising as the co-operative actually pays the same 
price, and on top of that the members receive a good return on the capital that they have 
invested in the co-operative. A couple of the interviewees (IOF suppliers) expressed a critical 
view of Södra, saying that some of the money arrives very late, i.e., the patronage refunds and 
the interests. Another explanation may be that the Södra model is complicated, which also 
implies that the members do not always consider the capital returns when they make their 
choice of buyer.  
 
•  “It is strange that there is not more debate about the Södra model.” (Interviewee 4, co-
operative supplier) 
 
A striking observation is that most interviewees seek advice from the local representatives of 
the buying firms (column j). As seen from the buying firms’ perspective, this is an ideal 
situation as their representatives thereby are able to make even more money. The forest 
owners do not seem to realise that they and the buyer representatives have opposing interests. 
Some of the interviewees even talk about the buyers’ representatives as if these were close 
friends, mentioning only their first names.  
 
There is no difference between co-operative members’ and non-members’ trust in the buyer 
representative. In both categories four of the five interviewees have much trust in the buyer 
representative. One would expect the co-operative suppliers to be more inclined to trust the 
Södra representative as a co-operative would hardly act opportunistically towards its 
members. The risk for deceitful behaviour would be higher in the IOF case. Such behaviour 
will, however, be reduced to the extent that the firm has been on the market for many years   11
and plans to stay there for many more years, and that the opportunistic behaviour may be 
discovered by the trading partners. The firms’ reputation is of vital importance. 
 
•  “When we sold some timber last time we sold to [name of one of the IOF buyers] because 
we know him.” (Interviewee 6, IOF supplier) 
•  “We do not sell at highest possible price – it is also a matter of personal relations.” 
(Interviewee 7, IOF supplier) 
•  “We sell to [name of one of the IOF buyers] and Jerry. He is good, I think.” (Interviewee 
7, IOF supplier) 
•  “I have a very good representative in Jerry at [name of one IOF buyer], a person you 
could really trust.” (Interviewee 8, IOF supplier) 
 
One may expect less experienced forest owners (column d) to favour the co-operative more 
than less experienced owners. In the group of co-operative members only interviewee 3 
admits poor knowledge of forestry, but this person relies heavily on a cousin, who is an expert 
in forestry as well as on the buyer representative. Among the IOF suppliers both interviewees 
6 and 7 declare themselves to be only slightly knowledgeable, leaning towards the buyer 
representative. The forest owners’ degree of practical work in their forest may serve as an 
indicator of knowledge and experience (column c). However, almost all of the ten 
interviewees report themselves to do most of the thinning, cleaning and other tasks on their 
own.  
 
Most interviewees talk to other forest owners often (column h). It is not possible to discern 
any differences between co-operative suppliers and IOF suppliers. There seems, however, to 
be a pattern such that the co-operative members talk to each other and the non-co-operators 
talk to each other. The co-operative members are more or less convinced that the co-operative 
is the best buyer, but whether this is for rational or ideological reasons is unclear. Likewise, 
none of the IOF suppliers can imagine themselves selling to Södra.  
 
When the interviewees got the question whether there are influences in the social networks, 
all but one denied that. They talk to each other but they neither try to influence another forest 
owner as to choice of buyer nor are they influenced by others. The choice of a co-operative or 
an IOF buyer is a sensitive issue, and therefore this is not a topic of conversation. Another 
explanation is that they talk about the issue but their pride prevents them from declaring that 
during the interviews. The issue of a co-operative or an IOF supplier is loaded with 
sentiments. The forest owners do not even care about informing themselves about optional 
buyers.  
 
•  “I don’t know the business principles of other timber buyers. I am a member of Södra.” 
(Interviewee 2, co-operative supplier) 
•  “Most forest owners around here deliver to Södra. (Interviewee 5, co-operative supplier)  
 
The high degree of loyalty to one or the other type of buyer becomes evident when the 
interviewees are faced with the question about what could induce them to change buyer. The 
question is almost hypothetical in the eyes of the forest owners.  
 
•  “If I were to abandon Södra because another firm sometimes offers a better price? That 
would not be a good idea.” (Interviewee 3, co-operative supplier) 
•  “A huge price offer.” (Interviewee 5, co-operative supplier)   12
•  “I would change buyer if Jerry [the IOF’s representative] died.” (Interviewee 8, IOF 
supplier) 
•   “No! I don’t care about Södra. I am independent.” (Interviewee 10, IOF supplier) 
 
Another expression of loyalty is whether the forest owners sometimes deliver to various 
buyers (column l). Södra’s bylaws do not require delivery obligations so also the co-operative 
members could deliver to any other buyer. The data reveal, however, that such behaviour is 
extremely rare. Only one Södra member says that he sometimes has delivered to an IOF 
buyer. Nobody in the other group has ever delivered to Södra, though they have sold to 
different IOFs. Nevertheless, the IOF suppliers appreciate the co-operative.  
 
•  “If we hadn’t had Södra, we would not have any good prices.” (Interviewee 8, IOF 
supplier) 
 
There is a clear difference between the two groups as to understanding of the Södra model 
and the appreciation of this (column k). All non-members dislike the model but they are 
poorly informed about it. Among the members there is nobody who objects to the Södra 
model – they are instead quite positive. The most remarkable observation is that the 
knowledge about this model is not very widespread among the members.  
 
•  “The Södra model – it is reasonable.” (Interviewee 5, co-operative supplier)  
•  “I get the money rather than any capitalist. … I feel like an owner of the firm.” 
(Interviewee 5, co-operative supplier)  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Proposition 1 says that Forest owners influence each other as to choice of buyer. In one 
respect this proposition gets strong support; the forest owners’ choice of buyer is often 
influenced by their parents’ choice. Except for this relation, the interviewees mostly deny 
both that they are influenced by others and that they try to influence others. On the other 
hand, they talk to each other about forestry, and of course also their choice of buyers and the 
prices they get.  
 
Figure 1 provides an overview over how many of the forest owners in the two groups have 
mentioned social contacts with other forest owners, the buying firms’ local representatives, 
and relatives and family members, and parents.  
 
An interpretation is that social networks have importance for the decision whether to sell to a 
forestry co-operative or an IOF buyer but not in the sense that anybody tries to convince 
anybody else. It is instead so that the forest owners confirm each others’ existing choices. The 
interaction between the co-operative members make them even more convinced that they 
have made a good choice, and similarly among the IOF suppliers.  
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Figure 1: Social networks for cooperative and IOF suppliers as concerns choice of buyer 
(figures express the number of interviewees who mention the specific type of contact) 
 
This is not to say that co-operative ideology is important. The members’ strong loyalty to 
Södra is instead because they have established social networks with other Södra members as 
well as various employees within Södra. They have come to consider themselves as co-
operative members. Co-operative ideology was not mentioned once during the interviews 
with the co-operative members. The suppliers to IOFs have rather an anti-co-operative 
ideology. They can not imagine themselves as suppliers to any co-operative. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that proposition 1 gets support. 
 
The second proposition, that Social influences are stronger among co-operative members, 
must be considered to be supported by the data. An indicator is that all five co-operative 
members talk to other forest owners, but only three of the suppliers to IOF buyers say that 
they do so. One explanation for this difference might be that the co-operative’s member 
democratic system is organised with local wards at the grass root level, and these wards are 
often quite active. The IOFs do not have any similar organisation.  
 
Proposition 3 says that The forest owners who seek primarily non-monetary benefits from 
their ownership are more prone to sell t0 the co-operative. There is a tendency that this 
proposition gets empirical support. Not one single of the co-operative suppliers say that price 
is their most important criterion with exception from respondent (1) who ranks the price to be 
crucial when he has large fellings. The most important factor is that Södra is a reliable 
partner. Three of the IOF suppliers consider price to be crucial for the choice of partner.  
 
The data do not support the fourth proposition, Forest owners, who are uncertain, are more 
influenced by social networks. One single of the co-operative suppliers (interviewee 3) 
expresses uncertainty in his knowledge about forestry. Two IOF suppliers (interviewees 6 and 
7) have poor knowledge in forestry. The difference is small.  
 
One indicator of uncertainty might be the fact that forest owners tend to seek advice from the 
buying firms’ local representatives. This may not be alarming for the co-operative members 
as they probably think that the risk of deceitful behaviour from the co-operative is low, 
whereas the suppliers to IOFs may have established a close relation to the buyer 
representatives due to uncertainty. With this interpretation, the proposition must be rejected 
since the trust in the buyer representatives is strong in both categories. 
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Even though only propositions 1, 2 and 3 get support from the data, the study has a value to 
the extent that it confirms that social networks are of great importance when the forest owners 
choose which buyer they want to deliver their timber to. The uncertainty in the findings is, 
however, quite large.  
 
The study suffers not only from a small sample but also from the interview technique which 
does not allow direct comparisons between the respondents. Both these deficiencies are a 
consequence of the sensitive issues. Forest owners in both categories consider that their way 
of running the forests are nobody else’s business. Hence, these deficiencies are difficult to 
avoid.  
 
This study indicates that the producers might be influenced by the social networks as to their 
choice between a co-operative and an investor-owned business partner. Hence, it provides a 
basis for further empirical research about the importance of social relations in a co-operative 
decision-making context. In prior empirical research about farmers’ behavioural patterns in 
relation to co-operative businesses – attitudes, loyalty, trust, attitudes, choice, etc – the focus 
is on either socio-economic variables or on socio-psychological variables, while social 
influences are missing.  
 
A promising type of study about social networks in connection with farmers’ view on co-
operatives would be one, where the respondents inform about their specific social contacts. 
Provided that the sample consists of individuals who have relationships to each other, it 
would be possible to make a formal analysis based on network theory (Karantininis, 2007).  
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